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The paper is an attempt to react as direct and as 
close as possible on Dummett’s 2007 paper by 
addressing his overall theses about bridging the 
gulfs between philosophers and physicists and 
between analytical and continental philosophy 
on the one hand and, on the other hand, picking 
up a couple of more detailed issues Dummett 
raises about physics and its philosophy.
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Sir Michael Dummett has presented 
an invigorating diagnosis of what he 
considers to be the place of philosophy 
in European culture.1 His diagnosis is 
lucid and profound, which makes the 
task of commenting on it a notably hard 
one. And this is even more so true for 
someone who basically shares all of his 
main theses. In particular, I do very much 
agree with his main concern about the 
paucity of dialogue between philosophers 
and physicists. Dummett’s diagnosis 
leads to the conclusion that philosophy 
must bridge two gulfs: while the fi rst gulf 
lies between philosophers and scientists 
(especially physicists), the other lies within 
philosophy itself pertaining to the widely 
perceived distinction between analytical 
and continental philosophy. And although 
the guest editors of this special issue have 
asked us to concentrate on the fi rst gulf, I 
feel tempted to react to some other remarks 
of Dummett’s as well. I will thus proceed 
by citing passages of Dummett’s paper2 
which I found particularly interesting and 
which give me the opportunity to direct 
reactions, roughly in the order in which 
1  Th e reader may be referred not only to paper (Dum-
mett 2007) but also to his 2010 book.
2  Unfortunately, the printed version of Dummett's pa-
per contains a lot of typos and grammar mistakes. I will 
use double square brackets [[...]] to indicate my own cor-
rections or hints on misprints within the quotes.





they appear in his text.
Dummett’s discussion starts with an identifi cation of the criteria of culture. For 
something to be a component of high culture it must “demand great skill of its creators” 
and it must “elevate the mind or the sou”l. But this is not suffi  cient. Dummett takes the 
example of mathematics to show that there’s a third criterion to be met: for something 
to be a component of high culture it must also be a component of the life of many 
people. Mathematics fails in this respect – as well as the natural sciences and, I take it, 
any formalized science in general (including logic and computer science).
Th e further mathematics and the natural sciences have advanced, the 
less and less have they been reckoned as what every cultivated person 
may be expected to know about. Th e natural sciences remain very 
infl uential, however, not directly through people’s knowing about 
them, but by apparently authoritative pronouncements by scientists 
about their implications.  (Dummett 2007, 23; 2012, 17)
Here I’m not so sure. It is sadly true that a cultivated and even an intellectual person in 
our Western world is not expected to know much about science. But is the nevertheless 
existing infl uence of the sciences really elicited and determined by “authoritative 
pronouncements by scientists”?
Let me tell a mundane story. Just recently I witnessed a piece of a radio show where 
people phone and chat with the DJ on air. Asked about her profession, one listener 
told that she worked as a mathematics teacher in high school. Th is was met with 
incomprehension on the radio host’s part. He couldn’t understand that someone (a 
woman in particular) chose mathematics as her subject. Th e listener tried with the 
brave reply that mathematics is the language of nature and that studying the language 
of nature is a fascinating enterprise. Th at culminated in an even greater ignorance on 
the part of the radio host who literally didn’t understand the listener’s claim. Obviously, 
the idea of studying the language of nature was beyond the DJ’s scope. Perhaps it was 
the element of abstraction necessary to grasp the link between mathematics and the 
natural sciences. But I doubt that the reaction would have been a lot diff erent, had 
the listener been a physicist rather than a mathematician. Th e point is that the layman 
doesn’t seem to refl ect at all about where the achievements of technology stem from. 
And this is true despite the fact that we are apparently living in a high-tech world. It is 
even true for someone sitting right in the middle of a broadcast studio talking to other 
people outside on their mobile phones while all of this is simultaneously broadcasted 
to hundreds of thousands of people afar.3
Th e infl uence of science, I’m afraid, has one simple and bovine reason: its technological 
applications. But because of the high level of specialization and sophistication of 
science and, accordingly, of the transformation of science into technology they both, 
3  I admit that the relationship between science and technology is in fact more complicated and not as linear as sug-
gested in my banal example. But whatever the relationship is, mathematics is of course important for both science and 
technology.
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science and technology, became extremely remote to the general public. Most people 
simply take the achievements of science as given, just as our predecessors took nature 
and natural forces as God-given. However, the remoteness of science from everyday life 
has serious implications. For the more remote modern science and its transformation 
into high-technology are, the less “authoritative” are the scientists’ statements – at 
least in the eyes of the general public. In the eyes of many, scientists do weird things 
which have nothing to do with everyday life and practice. Th ere is technology, yes, but 
who knows and who cares where it comes from? And who cares about valuing how 
amazing it is? Th e logic of the miracle argument for realism in science, the otherwise 
unexplainable fact of the tremendous success of science, becomes totally unnoticed by 
the vast majority of people. I’m not arguing here in favour of scientifi c realism (though 
I’m certainly in favour of it), what I want to point out is that the miracle argument 
has a prima facie plausibility usually felt and respected by anybody who is scientifi cally 
informed (realists and anti-realists alike). Th e fact that this superfi cial plausibility is 
beyond the scope of most of the people is a serious indicator of the dangerous remoteness 
of science. Science is no longer and not always judged as important. Scientists aren’t no 
longer and always judged as important, and – their statements aren’t always considered 
to be highly authoritative. What we can actually observe in high-tech societies is that 
quite the contrary happens. We see a dangerous return of pseudoscience, religious 
fundamentalism and even mysticism.
But perhaps my Philippic is beside the point, because I’m not talking about ‘high’ 
culture here. I do not speak about the general ‘educated public’, as Dummett does. 
But is there really such a clear divide? My worry is that what I just pointed out carries 
over to many of the so-called educated or even highly educated. It carries over to 
many working in the humanities, in art and also in the social and political sciences. 
So my worry is in fact even greater than Dummett’s. While he worries about the lack 
of information among philosophers about science only, my worry is that the general 
remoteness of science has already brought forth serious and worrisome impacts.
Has the same happened to philosophy?  
No. […] although philosophy gave birth to physics and, more recently, 
to other sciences, it is not seen as a ‘technical’ subject, like mathematics 
and natural sciences, or even the social sciences such as economics. It 
is available to the general educated public as the technical subjects are 
not, save to those who have been trained in them. […] Philosophy has 
not therefore lost its place as part of high culture, as have the natural 
sciences and mathematics. (Dummett 2007, 23-24; 2012, 17)
Th at sounds too good to be true. Whom does Dummett have in mind here? And 
what level of sophistication must we presuppose to come to the judgement that 
philosophy has not lost its place as part of high culture? Certainly, it is not suffi  cient 
to hear quotes from great philosophers like Plato, Aristotle or Kant in the soap-box 
oratories of politicians or representatives of the cultural scene. (Something comparable 
has happened to science, too, and even stronger: fi gures like Einstein, Darwin and 
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Hawking became part of modern pop culture.) I agree that philosophy is not seen as a 
‘technical’ subject, but this I would rather consider as a problem. Isn’t the actual technical 
level of philosophical discourse in fact comparable to the technical sophistication of 
physics and mathematics – at least to a certain extent? Nobody in the general educated 
public has any idea about topics like mental externalism, mereology, possible worlds, 
teleofunctionalism, supervenience, zombies, tropes, or 2D semantics. And what is 
more, there are lots of highly technical terms which falsely sound innocuous to the 
general public like ‘meaning’, ‘property’, ‘proposition’, ‘natural kind’, ‘causation’, and 
many more, since they are used in ordinary language without further refl ection. But 
how diff erent do they sound to a philosopher’s ear? As specialists, all of us know very 
well about the deep philosophical problems and obstacles connected with each one of 
them. So my worry goes quite into another direction than Dummett’s: many people 
believe that they know something about philosophy (or that they could easily delve into 
it if necessary), but do in fact heavily underestimate the level of technical sophistication 
of good philosophy.
I was impressed when an Italian daily newspaper ... printed articles 
on philosophy... Th ough I am ashamed to say that this would be 
unimaginable in Britain, I believe that something similar would have 
been possible in a French or German newspaper, and perhaps in other 
European countries.  (Dummett  2007, 24; 2012, 18)
As a German I am perhaps allowed to object. And this connects with the point before. 
Let me illustrate this with a concrete example. During recent years there was quite an 
extensive discussion going on in some decent German newspapers and journals about 
the problem of free will. So this seems to speak in favour of Dummett’s point. But the 
discussion was mostly quite unsatisfactory and disappointing. It was generally presented 
as a fi ght between neuroscience and philosophy. And I cannot help feeling that, by and 
large, the philosophers succumbed. Th ere are three points to consider here. Why, for 
instance, must one generally think of philosophers as being a fi ghting opponent to 
what the scientist says? Th e journalists seemed to expect this. First point. Since this was 
a debate between philosophers and neuroscientists one would have naturally expected 
(at least I would!) to hear more philosophers of science talking about the general issues 
providing the background of the debate as for instance (mental) causation, levels 
of complexity, reduction, and laws of nature. But I don’t remember, and this is my 
second point, even one philosopher of science  involved in those interviews. Th e third 
point is that the problem of free will is quite tricky (as of course the majority of ‘real’ 
philosophical problems). Whatever position one prefers in this muddled debate, it 
requires careful and subtle conceptual analysis – and there is simply no space for this 
kind of reasoning even in high quality newspapers (I got the impression that many 
colleagues already failed to make the simple and basic distinction between ‘reasons’ 
and ‘causes’ understandable to their scientifi c dialogue partners, let alone to the general 
educated public).
Philosophy cannot assume the triumphant posture that the natural 
sciences take up. It has made great progress since it was initiated by 
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the ancient Greeks; yet there are few philosophical problems that have 
defi nitively [[been]] solved. […] outside logic, there are few theories 
which all philosophers accept. (Dummett 2007, 25; 2012, 19)
I like this statement very much and I’m ready to believe it. Th ough I still wonder what 
the few theories are that all philosophers accept. Here’s an example of recent progress 
in philosophy of physics with a strong impact on philosophy in general: Ontology 
demands a clear understanding of the concepts of identity and individuality. Th e classic 
is Leibniz’ principle of the identity of indiscernibles (PII). With the advent of quantum 
theory (since the late 1920’s) this principle was considered to be violated by nature. 
Quantum objects, bosonic particles in particular, obey a statistics of indistinguishable 
particles, meaning that in order to be in accordance with empirical results arrangements 
of particles in many-particle-states can only be counted as physically distinguishable up 
to permutations of single particles. French and Redhead (2008) have argued, however, 
that a metaphysical notion of individuality in terms of haecceity (transcendental 
individuality, primitive thisness) can nevertheless be retained in quantum theory. More 
recently, Saunders (2006), following earlier work of Quine, has shown that although 
fermions are not absolutely Leibniz-discernible (in terms of intrinsic properties), they 
are nevertheless weakly discernible by means of irrefl exive relations (a relation R is 
irrefl exive if for all x in the domain ¬R(x,x) holds). Muller and Seevinck (2009) have 
then extended this result to quantum objects in general by considering relations based 
on complementary observables. Th is shows that at least a weak notion of individuality 
and, hence, a weak Leibniz principle are compatible with quantum theory. Th is is a 
remarkable example of the possibility of progress in philosophy. It is a progress in our 
metaphysical understanding of physics: there is now the option to stick with a notion 
of individuality, albeit a weak notion, but stronger than a mere haecceistic concept of 
individuality.
What is a genuine cause of regret is the paucity of dialogue between philosophers and 
physicists. Th e generality of philosophers know too little physics to dare to venture 
to treat of the philosophical problems it raises, or to take due to account of physical 
theories when addressing problems on which they bear... [[sentence misprinted]]
Here I disagree with the bold claim of the manifesto that analytic philosophers are 
both humanists and scientists: they may respect physics, but they do not know it. 
Specialist philosophers of physics speak a technical language among themselves, and 
fail to communicate with other philosophers in the mainstream.
Physicists are aware that their subject raises many conceptual 
diffi  culties, but do not image that either a training in philosophy or a 
discussion of these diffi  culties with philosophers would help in solving 
them. (Dummett 2007, 25; 2012, 19)
As I already indicated at the beginning, I decidedly agree with Dummett’s general 
analysis: there is a said paucity of dialogue between philosophers and physicists – and 
the two major reasons for this are the ones he mentions. On the philosophical side even 
analytic philosophers pay mostly only lip service to the sciences, on the scientifi c side 
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the idea that philosophy could help scientists to make progress with their own problems 
is almost non-existent. Th ose two points must be considered carefully one after the 
other. Let us fi rst have a look at the relationship between physics and philosophy.
Never before, I believe, have philosophy and the natural sciences been 
so far apart. (Dummett 2007, 26; 2012, 20)
Admittedly, the dialogue between philosophers and physicists is meagre, but it might 
have been even worse in former times. As I see it, the main origins of the divisiveness 
between science and philosophy lies in the raising of the German romantic-idealistic 
Naturphilosophie (natural philosophy) in the 19th century. Th is is not to say that 
Schelling, Fichte or Hegel did not know about the science of their time, but their 
fi rm conviction was that the empirical method of the more and more developing 
and establishing Naturwissenschaft (natural science) alone does not suffi  ce to tackle 
questions about nature’s nature. It had to be supplemented with elements of speculative, 
transcendental or in some other form “genuinely philosophical” knowledge. But 
empirical Naturwissenschaft had already started it’s triumph in terms of technological 
and industrial success and innovations, leaving speculative Naturphilosophie behind. 
So perhaps already in the the 19th century things had been worse. But be that as it 
may, history is of little help for our present situation.
What is also of little help are some of the incidental hostile statements from prominent 
physicists against philosophy, even philosophy of science. As Feynman once put it: 
“Philosophy of science is about as useful to scientists as ornithology is to birds.” Steven 
Weinberg or Stephen Hawking provide further examples. But on the other hand we 
have Einstein, Bohr and Heisenberg, or, to mention active scientists, Carlo Rovelli and 
Gerard ‘t Hooft, who are friendly and greatly open to discussions with philosophers. 
As usual, bad exceptions don’t prove the rule. Indiff erence, not hostility, is the main 
problem.
But how to overcome indiff erence? Dummett seems to recommend that issues of 
metaphysics can help to bridge the gulf.
Th e nature of reality is of course the subject-matter of that branch of 
philosophy which we call metaphysics: the philosophy of physics is a 
substantial part of metaphysics. Diff erent interpretations of one and  
the same physical theory – quantum mechanics, for example – yield 
what are in fact diff erent but, for the time being, empirically equivalent 
physical theories. We have, however, no examples of empirically 
equivalent theories – or that yield the same predictions of observable 
events – that is demonstrably not logically equivalent – capable of 
translating into one another and I doubt if there are any [[sentence 
misprinted]]. So the interpretation of physical theories is not a matter 
only for those with philosophical concerns, irrelevant to practising 
scientists. It can never be held for certain [that] the empirical results 
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will not favour one interpretation as against another. (Dummett 2007, 
26; 2012. 19-20)
Dummett seems to recommend that metaphysics and the realism debate, obviously 
scientifi c realism in particular, are especially important topics to help (re-)establishing 
the link between physics and philosophy. As an example, he hits upon the issue of 
theory underdetermination. I emphatically applaud to this, because I fully share 
his doubts about the existence of intriguing cases of underdetermination. And by 
‘intriguing’ I mean cases which are pressing cases at the front line of actual research 
and which are considered as cases of insoluble rivalry by the scientists themselves. Th e 
failure of the philosophy of science literature to pinpoint such cases is, I believe, a 
failure of the underdetermination thesis itself (Lyre 2011). Th e only half-convincing 
case of an underdetermination scenario in actual science is, as Dummett again rightly 
points out, the case of quantum theory with its never-ending interpretational debate 
(I will mention another case below, though). My personal guess is that this peculiarity 
of quantum theory together with a second peculiarity, the quantum measurement 
problem (two peculiarities which together make quantum theory really unique in the 
scientifi c landscape), is a strong indicator for the preliminary character of quantum 
theory as a fundamental theory (Lyre 2010).
But the interest of physicists in foundations of quantum theory is nevertheless meagre. 
Th e main reason is that the vast majority of physicists simply makes no contact with 
foundational questions in their everyday work. Physics, as any other science, has become 
a science of the complex. And most of the interest in the plethora of complex and 
higher-order problems has to do with the prospects of direct applications of scientifi c 
endeavours. Hence, the reasons for why science might be interested in philosophy 
must be distinguished along the lines of application versus foundations just as science 
divides into applied and foundational. Th is means that, for one, there is interest in 
philosophy insofar as it might help to overcome specialized problems in complex and 
higher-order regimes, and for another, there is interest in the prospect of providing 
foundations. But the foundational part of science nowadays certainly takes less than 
1 percent of science in toto, and this also drastically shapes the role of philosophy 
in science. For quite some years now we can already observe a development towards 
philosophical interests in particular scientifi c disciplines (one might only compare the 
section titles of the major philosophy of science conferences world-wide in the last 
10 or 15 years and how they shift away from classical foundational questions to more 
concrete and specialized problems).
Curiously, the decreasing interest in foundations can even be seen in foundational 
science itself. I’d like to illustrate this by another concrete example. Since a couple of 
years I am involved in a research project on the ‘Epistemology of the LHC’ run by 
physicists as well as philosophers and historians of science. My experience is that the 
physicists are indeed interested in the cooperation with philosophers and historians of 
science, insofar as they see a real chance to get insights and hints for possible progress 
with their everyday work. In the particular case of our project, however, the reason 
lies mainly in the extraordinary dimension of the LHC – as a physical experiment and 
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in terms of its methodology and logistics. In order to sustain such an experiment the 
scientists involved feel the need to understand the methodology and the functioning of 
their own science better and more deeply. Th e bigger part of our project therefore focuses 
on the nature of modelling and the relationship between theory and experiment under 
the conditions of big science. A smaller project also focuses on ontology (particularly 
on the ontology of the so-called Higgs mechanism and, more generally, on spontaneous 
symmetry breaking in quantum fi eld theories).
I can report the same experiences from another fi eld, the philosophy of mind and 
cognition. Here again the practizing scientists sometimes like to chat about the big 
questions of the mind or consciousness, but this mainly holds for occasional after-
work discussions. Th eir real interest in philosophers, if there is any, is to incorporate 
them into designing concrete experiments and to help interpreting the results (mostly 
by clarifying the used concepts). And this of course presupposes the willingness of the 
philosopher to delve into the particular technicalities involved.
Th us, by and large the interest of science in philosophy has already shifted from interest 
in foundations to special, usually far more complex problems. And it must be expected 
that this shift will proceed further. In this respect foundational and metaphysical 
questions will play only a subordinate role for the future link between science and 
philosophy. Th e pressure of applications in science also fi nds its expression in the link 
between science and philosophy. And this of course also has to do with time scales 
since the impact of a project on foundations is always less visible and measurable 
than on more specialized problems. To put it the other way around: whether training 
in philosophy and discussions with philosophers help the physicists to solve their 
foundational mathematical problems is not so clear, nor should it be the benchmark of 
the cooperation. In the case of foundational science the impact of interdisciplinarity is 
rather indirect and certainly not immediately seen.
Th is is, per se, not a tragic result. After all, philosophy of physics and physics aren’t and 
shouldn’t be the same. So there are questions which are of interest for the philosophers 
of physics only, and vice versa. Moreover, as far as teaching is concerned, things are 
slightly diff erent. My own experience with colleagues from physics and physics students 
alike is that they are quite interested and sometimes even enthusiastic about philosophy 
of physics classes, although the direct impact of the (mainly foundational!) topics in 
such events for their daily work cannot immediately be seen.
Having talked about the relation between physics and philosophy we must now concern 
ourselves with the relationship between philosophy of science, or more particularly, 
philosophy of physics and philosophy in general.
I should not like my remarks about physics to be heard as a retraction 
of my earlier disparagement of scientistic attitudes on the part of 
some philosophers, who take materialism as axiomatic although it is 
doubtful whether they could clearly explain what matter is. Because 
of the manifest great successes of the natural sciences, many scientists 
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have adopted an arrogant attitude to the eff ect that all we know we 
know by science. (Dummett 2007, 26; 2012, 20)
It’s always hard to make general claims about the scientists’ attitude. It seems to me that 
there are almost as many realists as there are anti-realists, as many reductionists as there 
are anti-reductionists, but still the majority, I think, simply adopts an instrumentalist 
or rather a pragmatist attitude towards science (meaning, again, that they don’t care 
about philosophy at all).
In talking about the scientistic attitudes on the part of some philosophers, however, 
Dummett hits upon a subtle point. I also fi nd it a disturbing fact that the label 
‘materialism’ has such a widespread use in philosophy, mostly in philosophy of mind. 
In fact, nobody is able to explain what matter is. Matter is one of the great mysteries 
of modern science. I already mentioned the Higgs mechanism. Th is mechanism is 
supposed to give an answer to the question of how elementary particles acquire mass 
(and it hinges on the still yet to be discovered Higgs boson). But there are strong reasons 
to doubt that this ‘mechanism’ is a mechanism in any causal or dynamical sense of the 
word (cf. Smeenk 2006, Lyre 2008). While it is rather tricky for the masses of the weak 
gauge bosons, the Higgs mechanism can quite easily be understood in its application 
to the fundamental fermion fi elds ψ. Start from a Yukawa coupling L’ ~ gψφψ to a 
scalar fi eld φ. By rewriting φ as a superposition of v and H we get L’’ ~ gvψψ + gψHψ 
now consisting of a fermion mass term with m=gv and a not yet detected coupling 
between ψ and the Higgs boson H. Quite obviously, the simple rewriting L’ → L’’ of 
the Yukawa term should not be confused with a causal process in nature. Moreover, all 
of the fermion mass parameters (diff erent values of g) must be put in by hand, so this 
‘mechanism’ provides us with no explanation of the particular fermion mass spectrum 
and values.
Moreover, even a possible derivation of a mass spectrum must still be distinguished 
from an explanation of the very nature of mass and matter. Special relativity considers 
rest mass as a form of energy. Very roughly put, in the Higgs mechanism the vacuum 
energy of a given fi eld φ is ‘rearranged’ so as to appear as the masses of the Standard 
Model particles. But this provides us with no deeper explanation of the nature of 
energy-matter itself. Th e concept of energy-matter is still a primitive concept of modern 
physics. Metaphysically speaking, it is as opaque as the concept of mind.
But while physics may have diffi  culties in explaining the ultimate nature of matter, 
this does not imply the impossibility of either physicalism or reductionism. It simply 
implies that the physicalist assumption that ‘the physical’ is basic (whereas, for instance, 
‘the mental’ is not) does not follow from any principal grounds but must be established 
by empirical science itself. On the basis of physicalism we can explain and understand 
by far more empirical fi ndings and possible interconnections between the various levels 
in science (from the physical to the neurobiological to the cognitive and the mental...) 
than by any other assumption about the nature of the bottom level. Th is is in accord 
with the above observation that certain physicalist key terms such as matter and mass 
are still primitive and, in a sense, opaque terms.
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Th e request of an empirical understanding of the interconnections between the various 
scientifi c levels shows the natural affi  nity of physicalism to reductionism. In the past, 
philosophers have drawn heavily on the concept of supervenience to spell out both the 
doctrines of physicalism and reductionism. Th e curious fact, however, that (a particular 
variant of ) supervenience already fails within physics itself was seldom considered or 
taken seriously outside the philosophy of physics community. Supervenience fails for 
two reasons within physics. Th e fi rst is well-known and is due to the phenomenon of 
entanglement in quantum theory: there are properties of a compound quantum system 
that do not supervene on any assignment of the properties of their parts. Such failures 
of supervenience may likewise also be characterized as non-separability or holism 
(Howard 1985, Healey 1991).  Th e second is less known and is due to holonomy 
eff ects in gauge theories (with the Aharonov-Bohm eff ect as the most shining example). 
Th ink of holonomies as non-local entities defi ned on closed loops in spacetime. In the 
Aharonov-Bohm eff ect the electromagnetic properties of loops do not supervene on 
any assignment of the properties at the spacetime points that constitute the loops. Th is 
must be understood as a general feature of gauge theories. Given that all of the four 
fundamental interaction theories in modern physics are gauge theories, this is a quite 
general and important result (Lyre 2004, Healey 2007).
Nevertheless, this result does not speak against supervenience per se but mostly against 
a localistic or pointillistic supervenience base – as for instance adopted by David Lewis 
in his infamous doctrine of Humean supervenience. Nature seems to tell us that non-
local entities should rather be considered in the base. Holonomies are a case at hand. 
From a general metaphysical perspective, my view is that structures as fundamental 
entities should constitute the fundamental supervenience base. Let me explain this by 
pushing the present example a bit further. As I’ve argued elsewhere (Lyre 2004), the 
Aharonov-Bohm eff ect and comparable non-local eff ects in gauge fi eld theories leave 
us with a case of underdetermination on the level of ‘object-like’ entities – be they 
either fi eld strengths, gauge potentials or holonomies – by mutually violating or being 
conform to one or two of the three diff erent basic locality assumptions in physics: 
local action, point-like interaction and separability as well as observability as a fourth 
criterion. In other words: experiment leaves our ontology underdetermined. Whether 
and which locality assumption one wants to adopt is in part a metaphysical decision 
in the sense that some such assumptions must already be presupposed in order to do 
physics as an empirical science. So on the one hand we get an old result: you can’t 
simply read off  your metaphysics from physics.
On the other hand, however, we may very well ask whether this is a pressing and 
intriguing case of underdetermination in the above sense: “a case of insoluble rivalry as 
considered by the scientists themselves”? Actually I don’t think so. Due to coherence 
and other comparable criteria with respect to other branches of theoretical physics, 
most physicists would, I take it, be in favour of the holonomies option. But one might 
also go a step further and argue that what remains invariant in all three scenarios 
(fi eld strengths, potentials, holonomies) is the gauge group structure of the underlying 
gauge fi eld theory. With such a move we restrict our realist focus on structure rather 
than on any particular object-oriented ontology. Th is view that I’m favouring here, 
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the view of structural realism, is a moderate version of scientifi c realism that in many 
respects indeed provides a tailor-made metaphysics for modern physics (cf. Bokulich 
and Bokulich 2011).
It may be argued what I have said about physics applies equally to 
other sciences, neurophysiology for instance, which concern human 
nature more than the nature of physical reality. Th at may be so: the 
problem is certainly not specifi c to physics, though I personally think 
that the philosophical conundrums raised by physics are deeper as well 
as more diffi  cult than those raised by other sciences. (Dummett 2007, 
26; 2012, 20)
Perhaps Dummett is right. But this does certainly not relieve philosophers of science 
from delving into the special sciences, especially the cognitive neurosciences. Philosophy 
of science has far too long focussed on physics as the paradigm example of science. Th is 
is a serious fault, as our discussion has already shown. It must perhaps be considered 
the task of philosophy of science at the beginning of the 21st century to delve into 
the more specialized higher-order sciences. Issues of confi rmation and explanation, of 
what scientifi c models and theories are, of experimental methods and theory ladenness, 
of laws of nature, of intertheory relations and reductionism, and, fi nally, of scientifi c 
realism change considerably when imported into the special sciences.
But there’s also another important aspect to be mentioned here. We have spoken about 
the neglect of physics and philosophy of physics by philosophy in general. But almost 
the same is true for the special sciences. Th e lack of knowledge about physics among 
biologists, cognitive scientists, economists, or social scientists, to mention just a few, is 
sometimes about as big as among philosophers. Philosophers of science, insofar as they 
are informed about physics, might be of considerable help here. Th is is particularly 
related to the issue of reductionism. Judgments about reduction and intertheory 
relations are at the same time judgments about the importance of lower-level science in 
constraining higher-level science. In my view, this opens a highly interesting prospective 
working area for philosophers of science with a direct impact and relevance for science 
in practice.
Two tasks lie before us, two gulfs are for us to bridge. One is that 
between philosophers, of all schools, and scientists (particularly 
physicists); the other that between divergent philosophical schools 
– between analytical philosophy and that amorphous style perhaps 
by contrast with analytical philosophy it should be called ‘synthetic’ 
philosophy misleadingly labelled ‘continental’[[sentence misprinted]]. 
(Dummett 2007, 29; 2012, 22)
Dummett’s paper centers around the place of philosophy in European culture. His fi nal 
thesis is that the second gulf, the one between analytic and continental philosophy, 
might best be bridged in Europe. I would like to add that in order to bridge this 
gulf one must simultaneously clarify the relationship between philosophy and science. 
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Hence, the two gulfs hinge together. I earlier claimed that one of the chief reasons 
of the divisiveness between science and philosophy had been the rather speculative 
nature of 19th century continental philosophy. But an all-too naïve, uncritical picture 
of science, which is not grounded in a deeper understanding of science, as can be found 
in many areas of analytic philosophy, is not of great help either. So both wings have 
to clarify their picture of science. And this implies a certain readiness to engage into 
scientifi c technicalities.
But a third gulf is yet to come. It is the gulf between applied and foundational science 
that carries over to philosophy of science and, accordingly, to any scientifi cally informed 
science. Here I can only speculate about what the future might bring. One vision 
is that, eventually, the gulf between applied science and foundational science might 
become larger than the gulf between foundational science and philosophy (instances 
of which can already be seen). And when the time comes, philosophy might perhaps 
help to overcome that third gulf. But this will be another story.
Acknowledgements: Many thanks to Ramiro Glauer, an anonymous referee, and the 
editors, Angelo Cei and Mauro Dorato, for helpful remarks and suggestions.
REFERENCES
Bokulich, A., and P. Bokulich, eds. 2011. Scientifi c structuralism. Dordrecht: Springer.
Dummett, M. 2007. Th e Place of Philosophy in European Culture. European Journal of Analytic 
Philosophy 3(1): 21-30.
Dummett, M. 2010. Th e Nature and Future of Philosophy. New York: Columbia University 
Press.
Healey, R. 1991. Holism and Nonseparability. Journal of Philosophy 88: 393-421.
Healey, R. 2007. Gauging What’s Real. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Howard, D. 1985. Einstein on Locality and Separability. Studies in History and Philosophy of 
Science 16: 171-201.
French, S., and M. Redhead 1988. Quantum Physics and the Identity of Indiscernibles. British 
Journal for the Philosophy of Science 39: 233–246.
132
Lyre, H. 2004. Holism and structuralism in U(1) gauge theory. Studies in History and Philosophy 
of Modern Physics 35(4): 643-670.
Lyre, H. 2008. Does the Higgs Mechanism Exist?. International Studies in the Philosophy of 
Science 22(2): 119–133.
Lyre, H. 2010. Why Quantum Th eory is Possibly Wrong. Foundations of Physics 40(9): 1429-
1438.
Lyre, H. 2011. Is Structural Underdetermination Possible?. Synthese 180 (2): 235-247.
Muller, F.A. and M.P. Seevinck. 2009: Discerning Elementary Particles. Philosophy of Science 
76: 179–200.
Saunders, S. 2006. Are Quantum Particles Objects?. Analysis 66: 52–63.
Smeenk, C. 2006. Th e Elusive Higgs Mechanism. Philosophy of Science 73: 487–499.
Received: September 5, 2011
Accepted: May 28, 2012
Philosophy Department
University of Magdeburg 




EuJAP  |  Vol. 8  |  No. 1 |  2012
